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Abstract—The current rise in malicious attacks shows that 
existing security systems are bypassed by malicious files. 
Similarity hashing has been adopted for sample triaging in 
malware analysis and detection. File similarity is used to cluster 
malware into families such that their common signature can be 
designed. This paper explores four hash types currently used in 
malware analysis for portable executable (PE) files. Although 
each hashing technique produces interesting results, when 
applied independently, they have high false detection rates. This 
paper investigates into a central issue of how different hashing 
techniques can be combined to provide a quantitative malware 
score and to achieve better detection rates. We design and 
develop a novel approach for malware scoring based on the 
hashes results. The proposed approach is evaluated through a 
number of experiments. Evaluation clearly demonstrates a 
significant improvement (> 90%) in true detection rates of 
malware.  
Keywords: Malware, Static Analysis, detection,  hashes, Internet 
of Things, 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Internet of Things (IoT) offer new and exciting 
opportunities  such as smart homes, smart devices, smart cities 
and smart transportation, to name but a few. IoT is growing at 
enormous scale and is expected to be used in connecting billion 
of devices in the near future. But as the market, scope and 
application areas of IoT increase, it becomes more vulnerable 
to various kinds of security breaches, such as malware, 
spoofing,  jamming, etc. — these issues been surveyed in 
related work [33]. This paper focuses on the issue of malware 
in the IoT. With the growth of IoT, the types of malware are 
continuously evolving. Having various devices connected to 
the IoT changes not only the attack target landscape, but also 
supplies criminals with resources that were previously not 
available. IoT security challenges have made the IoT devices a 
vector for powerful DDoS attack in recent years [1]. Malware 
target IoT devices vulnerabilities so that exploited devices can 
become part of a botnet. The longer the malware is not 
detected, the more devices it can exploit. Thwarting analysis 
implies that the malware samples have become more complex 
over time, therefore, the evolution of malware is two sided: the 
growth in numbers collected daily and the complexity of the 
samples being discovered. For instance, according to AV-Test 
Institute, over 856.62 million malware were collected in 2018. 
Only 13% (113.78 million) of these were new malware 
samples. The statistics from AV-test Institute show an 
exponential growth in the number of malware seen each year. 
The growth in complexity of malware is shown by the ever-
evolving complex methods discovered in collected malware 
samples that are used to evade and/or disable malware 
prevention and detection systems. 
 It is therefore crucial to generate new methods that can 
isolate files that are variations of malware which have already 
been known.  On one hand, this can shorten the time spent on 
analysing malware, and  on other hand, it can o detect malware 
in different stages. Detection of malware in stages reduces the 
impact of sample analysis on system performance as less 
number of malware is needed to be analysed [2]. The need for 
secure, trustworthy and high-performance devices [3] in IoT 
devices and other fast systems  automatically limits the use of 
dynamic analysis-based detection methods. Dynamic analysis 
requires more resources and more time to execute and observe 
the behaviour of the file. However, this is not feasible  in the 
IoT environment given the scarcity of resources.  
An efficient strategy is to utilise existing static feature-
evaluation methods and to design new approaches for better 
detection rates. Evaluating static features of a sample can be 
constrained by the structure of the file. In this paper, we 
therefore  focus on the Microsoft portable executable (PE) 
files. The rationale is that  90% of computer users in the world 
currently use Windows operating systems [4]. Moreover,  with 
the multiplatform Windows 10, PE files are expected to 
continue being a possible threat vector as Windows systems are 
used in or interact with IoT devices.  
The first crucial stage of triaging malware and clustering 
samples based on similarity matching normally uses hashing. 
Given that malware authors change internal structure/value to 
defeat basic hashing, a more complex hashing structure is 
needed.  Therefore, we  propose a combinational approach 
which is believed to lead to better results. If  file similarities 
detected by the hashes as used as attribute similarity factors for 
a sample dataset, multiple attribute decision making, and 
evidence combination mathematical models are applicable to 
automate the decision-making process of malware detection. 
Various uncertainty-based reasoning models have been 
designed to assist expert systems in decision making based on 
unreliable data. This paper exploits this theory in order to 
propose and design a new approach that synthesises different 
hashing techniques to provide a quantitative malware score and 
to achieve better detection rates. The main contributions of the 
proposed method are:  
• We combined tried and tested similarity matching 
hashes that are provided in almost all automated static 
analysis tools like Peframe and Virustotal. This implies 
that the deployment cost and manual effort required for 
dynamic analysis and advanced static analysis are 
avoided. 
• The proposed method is scalable which can be 
customised to the needs of a malware analyst.  
• Considering different hashes as file attributes reduces 
the storage capacity required by the system. This 
makes the proposed method light weight and more 
efficient.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
explores related work. Section 3 provides an overview of the 
background topics such as hashes, combination methods, and 
the evaluation approach used in the study. Section 4 describes 
design and modelling of the proposed method.  Evaluation and 
results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 presents 
conclusion of the paper.  
II. RELATED WORK 
 Although a lot of developments have been  made in anti-
malware research, most of the them have focused on 
behavioural analysis and dynamic heuristic analysis [6], [7].  
Static analysis-based research has a limited scope. Existing 
research work around similarity matching hash functions has 
been limited to malware clustering as discussed herein. Since 
the proposed approach in this paper  investigates into how 
multiple feature-based decision making has been utilised to 
improve malware detection rates in various scenarios, we  
discuss related work that has used multiple feature-based 
methods to improve malware detection. However, readers 
interested in general IoT security issues are referred to related 
work, such as [33] and [34], which provide surveys of 
challenges and open issues in IoT security. 
DigitalNinjas [8] is a technical report that shows an initial 
work in the use of fuzzy hashing similarity to detect malware. 
Using only Ssdeep hash to detect different malware families, 
the work achieves a level of confidence of 67%. French and 
Casey [9] extended this work by conducting a study using 
different fuzzy hashing methods. A comparative study of 
popular similarity hashes used in malware clustering   has been 
carried out in [10]. This study shows that fuzzy hashing 
outperforms cryptographic hashing. A methodology that 
clusters malware using Imphash based similarity checking was 
first introduced by Mandiant. This is now known as FireEye 
and is analysed in [11]. Although the results in [12] show 
higher sensitivity matching, the functionality of hashing in 
malware detection is still restricted to malware clustering. 
Similary, in other related work [8], [9], [11]–[15], one hash is 
used in each study.  
Multiple features-based decision making is  applied in 
heuristic engines which use algorithms that do not necessarily 
provide an optimum solution. Unlike the old signature-based 
detection methods, heuristics utilise different features in  
malware and have proven to be better at unknown malware 
detection. Combination of file features and file relations 
improve malware detection results. This was introduced in 
[16]  which developed a file verdict system called “Valkyrie”. 
The authors build a semi-parametric classifier model to 
perform the combination and test the model against a dataset 
of 39,138 malware samples. This model is reported to have 
been applied in the Comodo Anti-Malware software.   
Kolter & Maloof in [17] examine the results of various 
classifiers on malware detection through a simple heuristic 
based technique of text classification, which is known as n-
grams. The proposed approach tests techniques which include,  
Naïve Bayes, decision trees, support vector machines and 
boosted variants. This approach not only uses multiple 
methodologies to train and test the algorithm, it also gives 
good detection rates of 95%-98%. However,  this approach 
used a very limited dataset of 1971 malware which is a rather 
small dataset and thus it may not be applicable  to the 
enormous malware samples being collected nowadays.  
The MaTR [6] approach combines static heuristic file 
features and decision-tree machine learning algorithms to 
design a method  for improving  malware detection. This work 
initially recreates the experimental environment  
[17], highlights its weaknesses which are then used to build a 
a different detection algorithm.  Experimentation using a 
dataset of 31193 malicious and 25195 clean files leads to 99.9 
accuracy in the detection rates.  
Xinjian et al, [18] propose to combine both static and 
dynamic features in order to improve malware classification. 
This  method  uses classifiers and adopts the prediction  when 
the output is the same.  This work tested the proposed method 
on 282 samples which is a very small sized test dataset and 
thus has very limits the scope.  
The authors in [19] propose combining features using 
evidence combination methods  in the detection of android 
malware. This work treats each feature statically which is 
extracted from android applications as information sources. It 
uses Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence combination to 
combine the information sources. Using a dataset of 1580 
malware samples, the method achieves a detection accuracy of 
97% and a false positive rate of 1.9%. The results show that 
combining different features  improve malware detection 
rates.  In our work, we apply this method to PE files and use 
static based hashes as representatives of heuristic features. 
These are believed  to reduce  resources, cost and efforts as 
compared to existing  the method proposed in [19].  
Studies towards attaching a malicious score to a file as a 
method of malware detection have been an evolving topic in 
security research. Taking the approach of the CVSS (Common 
Vulnerability Scoring System), MAEC project  introduces the 
concept of a malware threat scoring system.  It uses predefined 
categories to attach a threat score to a file [20]. RSA, the 
security division of EMC has introduced the RSA Security 
Analytics Malware Analysis scoring categories [21]. Both the 
MAEC and RSA categories look at static analysis as a 
required category. Kumar et al [22] propose to attach a 
heuristic score to a PE file which is based on the features 
extracted from PE file itself. Using 10 static features and a 
dataset of 1360 malware and 1230 clean files, the proposed 
model achieves an accuracy detection rate of 85%. Although 
the detection rates are not high, the scoring approach proposes 
a method of allowing a malware analyst in classifying 
malware based on urgency. In the quest to build a more 
resilient cyber space, this work further explores and expands 
the approach introduced in [22] and is an extension of our 
previous work  presented in [23].  
The work in this paper focuses on calculating a malicious 
file score from combining different hashing techniques (e.g., 
cryptographic hash, ImHash, SSDEP, PeHash) for malware 
detection purposes. Mathematical theories rooted in uncertainty 
reasoning are explored. It  also  explores the hashes as heuristic 
feature representatives and investigates into the effect of 
similarity hashes in relation to malware detection.  
III. OVERVEIW OF THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE PROPOSED 
METHOD 
Existing malware detection methods rely on the expertise of 
malware researchers and analysts. However, it is difficult (if 
not impossible) to provide such expertise that can effectively 
and timely handle the massive numbers of newly discovered 
malware. This motivates the need for the design and 
development of new automated analysis methods that can use 
uncertain data to make decisions and  fight malware.  Many 
expert systems exhibit low errors in decisions  making using 
uncertain data as they  employ mathematical theories [24]. 
Thus as foundational information to our study, this section 
discusses the identified building blocks; the known and tested 
hash functions used in malware analysis, and uncertainty based 
cognitive approaches, and the methods used to evaluate the 
proposed approach. 
A. Hashing Functions 
Hashing functions are mathematical computations which 
take input (messages) and produce output (message digests) 
according to the contents of a file [12]. Some of the common 
hashes are illustrated as follows. 
1) Cryptographic Hashes:  These are the popular 
cryptographic hashes which include, MD5 sum, SHA1 and 
SHA256.  These are mainly used for file integrity checks. With 
respect to similarity matching, these are limited in scope and 
efficiency due to the fact, that a minor change in the file can 
have a negative influence on the overall computed hash digest. 
However,  these are  useful in malware analysis at the initial 
identification and classification stage [13] as an immediate 
match means that the file is an exact copy of a known 
malicious file.  
2) Ssdeep Hash: It is used to detect similarity in files and 
is usually known as Context Triggered Piecewise Hashing 
(CTPH) [25] or fuzzy hashing, It was  initially used for anti-
spam research (called Spamsum). It  is a non-cryptographic 
hash based on a combination of the piecewise hashing 
(Fowler/Noll/Vo –FNV hash)  and  rolling hashing as  shown 
in Fig. 1, which uses  an example of a 5 byte hexadecimal 
block.  
 
Fig. 1. Calculating the Ssdeep Signature 
 
Fig. 2. Ssdeep Signature Form 
Without considering the 64 signature length requirement of 
the algorithm, the FNV hashes are computed after setting a 
rolling window of a byte blocksize. The resulting CTPH 
signature is a concatenation of one string from the FNV 
hashes. A comparison algorithm then uses CTPH signature 
and Levenshtein Distance to calculate the sequence similarity 
between any 2 hashes. The score is normalised  such that 50 
score is  considered as a reasonable threshold for a good 
detection. Kornblum [25] adopted Spamsum for forensic 
science resulting into a function called Ssdeep. It  was applied 
to malware analysis by FireEye [26]. An Ssdeep signature of a 
file takes the form shown in Fig. 2  ̶  which also includes an 
extract of an Ssdeep hash of a file. It has a very high 
confidence of 99% for the return similarity match score for any 
2 files. and is therefore considered a critical step in static 
analysis of files. 
3) Imphash: Designed by cybersecurity firm - FireEye [9],   
Imphash is used to compute the digest of the import section of 
portable executable files in three stages:   
 
− Extract the structure of the PE file,  
− Populate the imports in the order {API, Function (dll or 
sys or ocx)} for each API being found. 
− Return the MD5 digest of the populated strings. 
Similarity matching using Imphash allows for clustering of 
malware based on the contents and order of the executables’ 
import tables. This hash is easily compromised by a change in 
the imports table order. Since malware can sometimes share 
some common system interaction behaviours, Imphash still 
plays a role in malware clustering. 
4) PeHash: It represents a binary cryptographic hash value 
[14] which is related to the structure of a  executable’s file. In 
addition to the structure of the file, PeHash algorithm uses 
bzip2 compression ratio as an approximation for Kolmogorov 
complexity  to get obfuscated data in file’s sections. With the 
possibility that some malware repeat the use of specific 
encryption techniques, different instances of the malware 
Blocksize: Block_Signature:Double-Block_Signature 
6144:tkDtqNp95Ltuj5K2…aJq1DWBEU/e:utUpDtqKmw/LqJWa 
 
sample can result in the same Kolmogorov complexity, thus 
creating a clustering mechanism. The algorithm first creates 2 
classes of hash buffers: global properties and section hashes 
buffer. The PeHash is the SHA1 value of the overall hash 
buffer of the file and is noted to provide efficient clustering for 
polymorphic malware.  
B. Evidence Combinational Methods 
These are mathematical approaches that combine various 
belief factors  which are determined based on different degrees 
of uncertainty in order to make  the best effort decision [27]. 
Assuming two pieces of evidence defined by different degrees, 
e.g., A and B are respectively defined with degrees a and b. If 
these supports the hypothesis (M), then the resultant decision 
mainly relies on the degree of belief gathered from the 
evidences. We use the  strict Archimedean t-conorms  (as with 
logical connectives) to design combinational decision making 
methods [28]. The degree of belief in Maliciousness hypothesis 
(M) is defined by the function: 
 in M    (1)  
1) Fuzzy logic: It is used in  situations when  deterministic 
data is not available. It states that the accurary or truth of end 
result depends on the accuracy of the support evidence [29].  
According to  [28], the algebraic sum is given by the following 
equation: 
   (2) 
2) The Certainty Factor model:  This model is used in rule 
based systems such as MYCIN expert system that is used to 
diagnose bacterial infections. In this model, the overall belief in 
the hypothesis is calculated by taking into account the 
uncertainty in a rule and a single common factor. Using the T-
conorms, given two pieces of supporting evidence, the overall 
degree of belief (O-DoB) ≥ (DoB-SE); which is  the degree of 
belief in single evidence [30]. This is  computed as:  
    (3) 
C. Method Evaluation Approach 
Evaluating the malware detection performance of the 
proposed method requires the use of the binary classification 
of the confusion matrix, as shown in Table I.  
TABLE I. CONFUSION MATRIX. 
                                     Analysis Results 
Actual 
Sample 
State 
 Malicious Clean 
Malicious True Positive(TP) False Negative (FN) 
Clean False Positive (FP) True Negative (TN) 
 
The options in the confusion matrix result obtained from 
the similarity matches lead to being able to calculate various 
detection rates by using different metrics,  shown in Table II. 
IV. DESIGN OF THE PROPOSED METHOD 
During the design phase we revisited and extended the PE 
format and  our previous work  [31].  
A. Design Choice of Hashes 
Table III shows the reasons as to why the various hashes 
were chosen. The resource section (rsrc) of a PE file is known 
to contain the information about any names and types of 
embedded resources. By combining the various aspects of the 
file sample using  4 various hashes, the overall achieved score 
is intended to represent the file’s similarity with respect to 
already known malware samples. 
B. Architecture of the Proposed Method 
Architecture of the proposed method is shown in Fig. 3. It 
considers the notations and metrics shown in Table II. The 
proposed method is divided into six different steps which are 
explained as follows. 
Step 1: The Initial Single File Study 
This initial study was performed on one randomly chosen 
clean file (arp.exe) from a Windows-based system. The 
original file was analysed and the different hashes of interest 
were computed. The file was then edited using Radare and the 
file hashes were recomputed. The hashes from the two files 
were compared. 
Step2:  Collecting the Datasets 
 Datasets in Table IV and Table VII are collected as 
follow: 
a) This study gathers dataset of malicious PE files from 
various sources such as malware from online malware 
repositories, our own honeypots and the malware repository of 
Nettitude Ltd, UK.  
b) Clean files from various types of Windows systems 
(e.g., Windows XP , Win 7, Win 8 and Win 10)  were 
collected.  
Each file was saved as its MD5 sum to ensure that there 
was no file duplication in the dataset. As shown in Table IV, 
malicious files were split into 3 sub-datasets, I, IIm and IIIm, 
and Clean files were split into 2 sub-datasets, IIc and IIIc.  
  
TABLE II THE ALGORITHM NOTATIONS. 
Notation Meaning 
Hdb Database of Hashes 
Imp_H Imphash 
Pe_H PeHash 
Sd_H Ssdeep Hash of the file 
RSd_H Ssdeep Hash of the file’s Resource Section 
Ni Set of elements of  attribute, i 
MD5 MD5 sum 
HFlag_set (H) The flag setting function for hash type, H 
PopHdb Populating Malicious files Hash Database Function 
HbDR Hash Based Comparison Detection Rates Function 
ic Hash of type, I,  e.g., Imp_H, Pe_H, Sd_H, RSd_H 
CFIi  Common Factor Index of an attribute, i 
ESFi Evidence Support Factor of Attribute, i 
TDR 
True Detection Rate calculated by:  
 
FPR False Positive Rate: a measure of the negative samples 
ba∗
bababa ⋅−+=∗
ba
ba
ba
⋅+
+
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TNTP
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+
flagged as positive. This is given by:  
 
Recall 
 
Based on thefollowing equation it calculates  the number 
of  actual positive files being detected: 
 
PPV 
Precision/ Positive Predictive Value (PPV) is measured:  
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 
ACC 
This is a measure of Accuracy  of  true detections, which 
is calculated as       
TP+TN
TP+FP+TN+FN
 
F1 
The harmonic mean of precision and recall is calculated:      
 
CHA Combined Hashing Approach 
TLBSA Traffic Light Based Scoring Assessor 
FLM Fuzzy Logic Method 
CFM Common Factor Model Method 
GTP Green Threshold Percentage 
ATP Amber Threshold Percentage 
TABLE III.  ARGUMENT FOR IN SCOPE HASHES. 
Hash Type Reason 
PeHash Overcoming Malware 
Obfuscation 
Imphash Classification by API 
File Ssdeep Hash Overall File similarity 
Resource section Ssdeep 
Hash 
PE Resource section file 
similarity. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. The architectural representation of the proposed method 
TABLE IV. DATASETS FORMATION AND WHERE THEY ARE USED IN THE 
METHOD. 
Dataset Use in the system 
I To populate the database of hashes 
II⟵{IIm, IIc} 
Used to calculate the True detection rated 
of the Hashes and the respective CFI.  
III ⟵{IIIm, IIIc} To validate the proposed approach 
ALGORITHM I: ALGORITHM FOR GENERATING THE DATABASE OF HASHES 
Input: Malware Dataset I 
Output: Signature Hashes Database Hdb 
1:  procedure: PopHdb  
2: for file f in I do 
3:           Extract the file hashes 
4:                     Hashes (f) ⟵ {MD5, Imp_H, Pe_H, Sd_H, RSd_H} 
5:           If Hashes(f) ∉ Hdb  then 
6:                add Hashes(f) to Hdb 
7: end for 
8: end procedure 
Step 3: Populating the Database of Hashes Signatures 
The database of hashes (Hdb) for the malicious files that are 
used as the initial signatures are calculated from random 
malware samples. These are collected in dataset I using the 
process  of Algorithm I.  
Step 4: Hashes Similarity Based Criteria Factor Index (CFI) 
Formulation.   
Dataset II which has both malicious files and clean files is 
used at this stage. This step is broken down into 2 sub-steps; 
a) Determine the individual performance of the hashes 
in relation to malware detection. 
This involves comparing the hashes calculated for files in 
dataset II against the Hdb by formulating the HFlag_set, where 
each of the 4 hashes has a specific position. For each file in 
Dataset II, five respective hashes are computed. Four different 
queries are run against the database. Each query returns a set 
of tuples; 
 
 XHi ← {md5, {Imp_H, Pe_H, Sd_H, RSd_H}} (4) 
ALGORITHM II: ALGORITHM FOR CALCULATING  DETECTION RATES. 
FPTN
FP
+
FNTP
TP
+
callPPV
callPPV
Re
Re2
+
⋅⋅
Dataset II 
Hashes 
Comparison
CFi Generator
Dataset I
Dataset III 
Hashes 
Generator
Hdb 
Detection Rates 
Generation
Evidence Combination 
Detection mechanism
File Malicious 
metric (%) 
& 
Recommendation
PeHash
ImpHash
File Ssdeep Hash
Resource Section
 Ssdeep Hash
Cryptographic Hashes
(MD5, SHA1, SHA256)
Populating Database of hashes Algorithm
Populate True Detection Rates Algorithm
Combination of Evidence based Detection Algorithm
Combination of 2 or all algorithms.
 
Input: Ds ⟵Dataset II , Hdb 
Output: Det_Rates  
Overall Hash Based Detection Rate Phase 
1: procedure: HbDR  
2: for file (f) in Ds do 
3:     HFlag_set f  
4:     for i = 1 →  4                               ⊳Loop through all the hashes flags     
5:           if f ∈ IIm then 
6:               if HFlag_set fi  then 
7:                     TPi = +1   
8:                       else  
9:                     FNi = +1 
10:              end if 
11:            end if 
12:            if f ∈ IIc then 
13:               if HFlag_set fi  then 
14:                     FPi = +1   
15:                       else  
16:                     TNi = +1 
17:                 end if 
18:              end if 
19:            Update DetectionRatesi ⟵{TPi, FNi, FPi, TNi} 
20:     end for 
21: return Det_Rates 
22: end procedure 
 
During the comparison of PeHash and Imphash, only the 
hashes, which are the same as the calculated hash, are pulled 
from the database. The HFlag_set position corresponding to 
the hash of type i is not a set if the set Xhi is Ø (null) and is a 
set otherwise.  For resource Ssdeep hash and file Ssdeep hash, 
all the hashes are pulled from the database. A Ssdeep 
similarity match is done for the file hashes and the respective 
database populated hashes. If the maximum similarity 
percentage calculated is greater than zero, the HFlag_set 
position corresponding to the hash of type i is set. It is not set 
otherwise. Each file corresponds to one set of HFlag_set. The 
total count to achieve the confusion matrix parameters is 
populated for each hash as shown in Algorithm II. 
b) Calculate the CFI of all the individual hashes. 
The detection rates obtained in sub-step (a) are used to 
calculate the CFI of each hash which is used as a belief factor 
for each hash. To minimise the error in the belief factors, True 
detection rates are used to calculate the factors. The true 
detection rates are normalised to the uniform range [0, 1]. 
Simple Additive weighting [32] is applied to the detection rate 
so that the degree of belief/ Criteria Factor Index (CFI) for 
each Hash method is defined as: 
CFIa =               (5) 
These CFI values are used as the belief factors for the 
respective hashing techniques. This supports the hypothesis 
that the file is indeed malicious. The values calculated are 
applied in the next step in order to obtain an overall malicious 
score for the file under test. 
Step 5: Application of Evidence Combination Theory. 
 The values of Criteria Factor Index (CFI) are used as 
inputs to the combinational approach application. The MD5 
comparison phase is a redundancy step, which is introduced to 
avoid replication of the malware samples in the experiment. 
The Hashes comparison phase uses the file calculated hashes 
and compares them against Hdb. The query in equation (4) is 
used in this phase too. The belief factors for the hashes are 
computed from the results obtained from the respective 
queries. For PeHash and Imphash, if the resulted set is not 
null, then the corresponding ESF is equivalent to the CFI of 
the respective hash. Otherwise the hash’s ESF is set to zero. 
For Resource Section Ssdeep hash and file Ssdeep hash, the 
corresponding ESF is equivalent to the CFI multiplied with the 
maximum similarity percentage, which is achieved by 
comparing the file and the hashes in the database. The 
Calculated ESF values of the various hashes are combined 
using the evidence combinational models detailed in Section 
III. This is to get the algebraic sum for the overall hypothesis 
which is fed into the TLBSA (Traffic Light Based Scoring 
Assessor). 
Step 6: TLBSA Thresholds. 
 The resultant percentages from the combined hashing 
technique are compared to add an overall TLBSA that 
evaluates the score attached to the file. It gives the user a 
recommendation based on Table V. Since the system does not 
completely guarantee that the file is safe, the final decision on 
how the file analysis  is handled, is left to the system user or 
analyst.  
TABLE V. THE TLBSA COLOUR DEFINITIONS 
Colours Deduced file intent System Recommendation 
Red Definitely malicious Do not Install 
Amber Medium Suspicion 
Highly encouraged to submit it for 
further analysis 
Green Low Suspicion Submit it for further analysis 
TABLE VI.  TEST BENCH SPECIFICATIONS 
Tool Specifications/ Details 
Computer system Dell T1700, CPU – Intel  Xeon@ 3.1GHz,  
RAM 32GB.  Hard Disk – 500GB 
Machine OS Linux Mint 17.1 (  #64 – Ubuntu SMP) 
Static Analysis tool Study specific Static Analysis Tool  
− calculates the Ssdeep, Resource 
Section Ssdeep hash, PeHash, and 
Imphash 
Data management tools SQLite Studio version 3.0.6. 
Python IDLE version 2.7.9 
TABLE VII. THE EXPERIMENTAL DATASET 
Dataset I II III Total Files 
Malicious files 34224 32844 37460 104528 
Clean files  698 940 1638 
TABLE VIII. MALWARE TYPE DISTRIBUTION IN THE MALWARE DATASET 
Malware Type Percentage Malware Type Percentage 
Trojan 66.84% Dropper 0.65% 
Adware 22.30% Virus 0.29% 
Worm 9.03% Spyware 0.11% 
Downloader 0.71% Exploit 0.08% 
i
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V. EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED METHOD 
This section presents the evaluation of the proposed 
method. It first describes the dataset preparation process and 
the test environment. It then provides an analysis and 
discussion of the results. 
A. Dataset Preparation and Test Environment 
For the experiment, we collected 104528 malicious files. 
All these were investigated using ClamAv engine version 
0.99.2 in order to ensure that they were indeed known 
malicious files. As shown in Table VII, the total dataset was 
prepared so as to have different sets for the different steps in 
the experiment. The malware family distribution of the used 
dataset is shown in Table VIII. The algorithms were 
implemented in Python and the database of Hashes was  
managed using SQLite in a Linux box. The specifications are 
shown in Table VI. We use the Linux as a safe environment 
since the malware are all PE files and therefore ensuring that 
the results are not corrupted by unknown self- infection. 
B. Results and Analysis. 
Table IX shows the similarity matching based results 
achieved in the first phase of the study with the single file 
analysis. Some hashes are heavily affected by a small change 
in a file while there is possibility of a small or no effect in 
other hashing functions. This justifies the reason of further 
exploring hash-based similarity matching for a possibility of 
efficient malware detection.  
In the second phase, Dataset II is used to compute the CFI 
metric values of the four hashing techniques which are shown 
Table X. The results obtained are also used to evaluate 
detection rates of the different hashing techniques, as shown in 
Fig. 4. Dataset III is used to calculate the overall percentage of 
file maliciousness in order to validate the proposed 
framework. The results achieved for the proposed approach 
are compared against the results achieved for each individual 
hash in Fig. 6. Fig. 5 represents the file scoring area curves of 
each adopted method which shows that most of the malicious 
files’ score is higher than the clean files. We compare the two 
proposed methods and the individual hashes in Fig. 6. Since 
the aim of this study is to devise an optimum malware 
detection methodology, we further investigate the true positive 
and false negative trade-off of the two methods in Fig. 7. Fig. 
8 is used to determine TLBSA threshold percentages. We then 
present the detection rates of each family of malware achieved  
in Fig. 9. 
TABLE IX.  COMPARISON OF HASHES FROM THE SINGLE FILE STUDY 
Hash Type Original File Value Edited File Value Match 
(%) 
MD5 33f9b0e02d9d93f920605d02fb53f3fd accd6591b8b8dad5f7f1470c90971e75 0 
SHA1 4a22e401ad5adb7b3de8f819e86d8461d764d195 06b98e35c1f92f844b57376ee467ee977cc074bd 0 
SHA256 1f4c090dfa389b3c6b16eb42299fb815f24efac7ca541bb60821e3da01
31b8f6 
bd4f056223439e83f2fffbe3c463e178da8465fabeb51243c04
a3d2922de8fa2 
0 
Ssdeep-
File 
384:5u3Smmq6aYaBpYFAfjhXrToHWS4mW4sme9V:Avmq6affY
FAfjhr8sgE 
384:5u3Smmq6aYaBpYFmfjhXrToHWS4mW4sme9V:Av
mq6affYFmfjhr8sgE 
99 
PeHash 5515f8e47661c7e170aee948cca7c8dc6198c08f 5515f8e47661c7e170aee948cca7c8dc6198c08f 100 
Imph 880bb6799a6e1a5ff7b4f022ff4003a9 880bb6799a6e1a5ff7b4f022ff4003a9 100 
Ssdeep -
Resources 
96:8EWS1pEmWwOh/VsBgtAb88caS5Ur9I5fa9VWPBMXsmrC9V
:NWS4mWNJXCu6Xsme9V 
96:8EWS1pEmWwOh/VsBgtAb88caS5Ur9I5fa9VWPBM
XsmrC9V:NWS4mWNJXCu6Xsme9V 
100 
 
TABLE X. COMPUTED METRICS 
Malware detection performance of the individual in-scope Hashes and calculation of the CFI 
  Recall (%) PPV (%) ACC (%) F-score (%) 
Detection Rates CFI 
(%) TRUE (%) FALSE (%) 
ImpH 85.6 93.3 89.7 89.3 85.7 14.3 27 
PeH 82.8 100 91.4 90.6 83.1 16.9 26.2 
FuzH 76.2 100 88.1 86.5 76.7 23.3 24.1 
ResFH 71.7 99 85.5 83.2 72.3 27.7 22.7 
     
 
Fig. 4. The Hashes Detection Rates using Dataset II. 
  
Fig. 5. The Clean and Malware file Score Area curves (a) Common Factor method and (b) Fuzzy Logic Method. 
 
Fig. 6. Comparison of the Hashes and the Evidence Combination methods  
Fig. 7. TP rate vs FP rate curves for the Combination methods. 
 
Fig. 8. Recall, Precision, Accuracy and F-score Comparison for the 
proposed methodology percentage thresholds. 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. Malware type detection ratios for the dataset used. 
TABLE XI. COMPARING  DETECTION RATED FOR THE TLBSA THRESHOLDS 
Comparative analysis of the performance of the proposed method 
after application of the TLBSA. 
  
Prec 
(%) 
Recall 
(%) 
Acc 
(%) 
F-
Score 
(%) 
Fuzzy 
Logic 
Method 
 (FLM_GTP (≥25%) 99.2 92.2 91.6 95.5 
(FLM_ATP (≥75%) 99.9 70.5 71.2 82.7 
Common (CFM_ GTP (≥25%) 99.2 92.1 91.6 95.5 
Factor 
Method 
(CFM_ATP (≥70%) 100 69.8 70.4 82.1 
C. Analysis and Observations 
This study designed and evaluated two methods for 
combining the individual hashes results for malware detection. 
Table IX results, achieved at the first stage of the study, show 
that similarity hashes are effective in matching similar files, 
which have slight differences in their content. Using dataset B, 
the introduced resource section hash matching gives the 
second-best precision value in the 4 hashes  in which PeHash 
is the best performing of the 4 hashes as shown in Fig. 4. 
Imphash gives the highest false positive detection but also 
provides the lowest false negative detection. The different 
levels in the detection rates provide an argument for 
combining them to achieve a more efficient detection 
approach. Analysis of the logs to validate the Combined 
hashing methodology results into achieving an overall false 
detection rate of 6.8% and a true detection rate of 93.2%. 
These are the best performance values in comparison to the 
results achieved by the individual hashing algorithms as 
shown in Fig. 6.  We analysed the dataset clean file scores vs 
malicious file scores for the two evidence combination 
methods. Both curves in Fig. 5 show that 83% of the malicious 
files obtain a malicious score above 50% while 78% of the 
clean files have a malicious score less than 50%. However, 
reviewing the true positive to false positive detection trade-off 
in Fig. 7,  the proposed methods shows that this technique is 
susceptible to very high false positive of 60%, thus requiring 
an evaluation of the model to achieve a better trade off.  
We therefore introduced the TLBSA assessor at this stage, 
as described earlier by creating the percentage thresholds for 
the 3 zones. With the thresholds obtained, we evaluated how 
well our methods work against the individual hashing 
algorithms in Fig. 8. ATP outperforms all the individual hash 
techniques. However, since this percentage creates a very low 
True Positive rate of 70% for the Fuzzy logic method and 62% 
for the Common Factor Model method, there is a need to 
analyse the needed GTP. It creates a much-needed rise in the 
True Positive rate of 92% for both the proposed techniques. 
The use of TLBSA increases the detection efficiency of the 
system as shown in Table XI. The threshold percentages allow 
optimum trade-offs and enable the system to provide a user 
with information that helps protect their system with an 
accuracy of at least 92% that has been achieved in this study. 
Fig. 9 shows the overall detection ratios for the malware types 
in the used dataset. Of the 8 types collected, the designed 
method provides efficient malware detection for 6 types.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
This study developed a new approach to combine the 
results from individual similarity hashes to demonstrate an 
overall best performing recall of 92%, a system accuracy of 
91%, a precision of 99%, and an F-score of 96%. These  
results significantly outweigh the results when one considers 
the detection rates of the existing individual hashes. Our 
approach is flexible and it can be customised and extended by 
malware analysts for the analysis of other file types. Our 
approach is safe against sandbox and dynamic analysis 
environment evading malware since it uses static analysis.  It 
simplifies the identification of malicious files by providing a 
quantitative value that indicates how malicious a file is. It also 
optimises the storage required for database of hashes. 
Furthermore, it allows for an easy update of signatures so that 
performance can be increased with the increase in number of 
hash signatures. Our system design used light weight tools that 
makes it significantly efficient. The results achieved in this 
study show that the proposed method provides a way of 
building an efficient, integrated malware detection system for 
IoT devices. .  
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